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Controlling Cyber Arms,
and Creating New LEGOs
John Arquilla identifies flaws in a potential U.S.-China
cyber arms control pact, while Joel C. Adams suggests
an unusual way of preserving computer science history.
John Arquilla
“A Farewell to
(Virtual) Arms?”
http://bit.ly/1RkiAfA
October 2, 2015

Much attention has been
focused recently on the budding possibility of a Sino-American cyber arms
control agreement, whose foundation
would be a mutual pledge of “no first
use” of bits and bytes to cripple critical
civilian infrastructure. It is an intriguing development, despite having three
troubling flaws.
The first problem afflicts the agreement’s logical basis, given that both
sides pledge not to mount such attacks
“in peacetime.” But what if such an attack, a “digital Pearl Harbor,” were to be
the opening act of war—when “peacetime” would have been thereby ended?
A bit of a conundrum, complicated
further by the fact that most advanced
militaries rely, to varying degrees, on
civil infrastructures they do not own or
control for much of their communications, logistics, and other functions. So,
in a sense, civil infrastructure can actually be viewed as consisting of a range
of strategic, military-related targets.
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Next there is the major perceptual problem that lies at what might
be called the “boundary layer” of this
agreement that does not explicitly extend to cyber espionage. The difficulty
here is that the sorts of actions, exploits, and intrusions that go with virtual spying are observationally equivalent
to the preparatory access to the adversary’s systems that would be sought prior to launching an actual attack. Thus
the cyber peace would always be poised
on a knife-edge of instability. A related
perceptual complication is that the
ultimate identity of the attacker is not
always clearly or easily distinguished—
and so the potential for a third party, C,
to attack A anonymously, or to finger innocent B as the culprit, is a very real risk,
one that might lead to escalation to war
in the physical world—which was the
scenario I unfolded in my short story in
Wired back in 1998, “The Great Cyberwar of 2002” (http://bit.ly/1XMUSfy).
The third difficulty with the SinoAmerican cyber arms control initiative
lies in its scope. The initially narrow focus on infrastructure protection does
little or nothing to deal with the largescale theft of intellectual property that
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constitutes what can be called the
realm of “strategic crime.” U.S. President Barack Obama has said much
about this over the past few years, and
has explicitly called out China as a culprit. In a public statement growing out
of a meeting between him and Chinese
President Xi Jinping, both leaders affirmed neither country would knowingly engage in intellectual property theft.
When asked during his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee whether there was any real
chance of curtailing intellectual property theft, the director of National Intelligence, former general James Clapper,
gave a one-word answer: “No.” He went
on to make critical comments about the
possibility of cyber arms control, indicating instead his preference for a focus on
improving defenses. His only nod to any
sort of agreement was an allusion to Ronald Reagan’s approach to engaging in
arms-reduction talks with the Russians
back in the 1980s: “Trust but verify.” So
it seems, even in American officialdom,
the window of opportunity for cyber arms
control has only been opened a crack.
Yet it may prove enough of an opening to move ahead, for the “no first use”
doctrine has caught on in the nuclear
realm—though it took many decades
for the U.S. to decide to move in this
direction (there are still some extreme
conditions noted in the American nuclear posture statement that would allow first use, but for all practical purposes this is no longer a usable first option).
Issues of verification aside, nations—not just China and the U.S., but
others, too—have incentives to behave
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circumspectly about starting a strategic
cyberwar that would incur huge economic costs and run the risk of a virtual
conflict escalating into a shooting war
in the physical world. Full disclosure: I
introduced the idea of a cyber no-firstuse doctrine in an article in the journal
Ethics and Information Technology back
in 1999 (“Can Information Warfare
Ever Be Just?” http://bit.ly/1kpQRPq),
so I am hardly impartial. It has been a
long wait to hear leading heads of state
talking about such a possibility, and
we must allow the discourse to unfold,
rather than simply to dismiss it as idealistic or quixotic.
The best way to envision cyber
arms control may be to think of it as
analogous to other controlled activities in areas in which diffusion of the
enabling technology itself is unstoppable. In the varied realms of chemical
and biological weapons, for example,
countless nations have access to the
materials required to craft such weapons. And yet there are behavior-based
arms control agreements in force, to
which nearly all countries subscribe,
that forbid their use. In the main,
there is strong compliance with few
violations. Such compliance may well
be possible in the cyber arena, too. It is
an approach well worth exploring.
With regard to the logical possibility
that a “peacetime” pledge is not violated
if a strategic cyber attack starts a war, the
response to this concern is that such an
attack could still be limited to militaryrelated targets. To return to the nuclear
analogy, this would be very much like
the “counterforce” strategic doctrine of
the Cold War era that sought to target
missiles and other military targets, not
population centers. In this way, it was
thought, a nuclear war could be waged
without massive civilian deaths.
Only a small portion of critical infrastructure is essential for military
operations, so cyber combatants would
have good chances of operating against
armed forces without imposing too
much civilian suffering. To be sure, a
conflict of this sort would inflict much
costly, disruptive collateral damage,
but far less than would be the case in
a city-busting, apocalyptic general nuclear war. Thank God counterforce nuclear doctrine was never put to use. But
cyberwar is much more thinkable than
an atomic Armageddon, so the counter-

force doctrine that never had to be used
for its original purpose may well be
dusted off when thinking about how to
conduct conflict in the virtual domain.
The most nettlesome problem,
of course, is the veil of anonymity in
which cyber aggressors—nations or networks—may be inclined to enshroud
themselves. Clearly, forensics must continue to improve so as to identify attackers accurately. And just as clearly, a great
deal of work is needed to bring forensics
up to the needed level of accuracy. Also,
strategic deception about the identity of
the perpetrator, as mentioned earlier,
must be guarded against. But these challenges are no reason to give up on the
promise of cyber arms control.
On balance, the emerging, maturing discourse about applying notions
of arms control to the cyber realm is a
“net positive” (no pun). There are indeed obstacles to overcome, but the
potential gains for peace and cybersecurity make the efforts to master these
challenges more than worth the while.
Joel C. Adams
“A Lovelace, Babbage,
and Analytical Engine
LEGO Set?”
http://bit.ly/1JvpkC6
August 29, 2015

LEGO has a crowdsourcing ideas site,
at https://ideas.lego.com/, where LEGO
fans can pitch ideas for new LEGO sets.
What a great way to let your audience
help you conduct market research!
Hugh McGuire was kind enough
to send me a note about a Lovelace
and Babbage set (https://ideas.lego.
com/projects/102740) that Stewart
Lamb Cromar has proposed. The set
would include LEGO figurines for Ada
Lovelace and Charles Babbage, LEGO
pieces to build a representation of the
Analytical Engine, punch cards, and related pieces. The various pieces would
be styled with “a steampunk aesthetic”
to capture the imaginations of young
builders. The set would thus let young
LEGO builders realize Babbage’s vision
by completing his Analytical Engine,
and learn about the historical roles
played by Babbage and Lovelace.
(For those who have forgotten their
early computing history: back in 1837,
Charles Babbage designed a generalpurpose (that is, programmable with
punch cards) mechanical computer he

called the Analytical Engine. Although
a working Analytical Engine was never
built, Ada [the Countess of] Lovelace
understood the design’s potential and
corresponded with Babbage about it.
She developed a detailed algorithm for
using the Analytical Engine to compute
Bernoulli numbers, for which she has
been dubbed the first computer programmer. In honor of her contributions,
the Ada programming language was
named after her. Those interested in
more details should read “Lovelace and
Babbage and the Creation of the 1843
‘Notes’” (http://inroads.acm.org/article.
cfm?aid=2810201) by Fuegi and Francis.)
Many stories from the “steampunk”
genre take place in alternative universes where Babbage actually built an Analytical Engine powered by steam and
Ada wrote programs for it. Such stories
generally explore the question, “What
if ... the power of computing was unleashed in the Victorian era?”
Back in our universe, the dimensions of the LEGO Analytical Engine
would be sufficient to accommodate a
Raspberry Pi 2 (https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-2-modelb/), if one wishes to put a computer inside. That would be fun to see: a LEGO
Analytical Engine driving an LCD display, mouse, and keyboard!
One of the motivations for the set is
to commemorate the 200th anniversary
of Ada’s birth (Dec. 10, 1815). The set
would thus teach young LEGO builders
some early computing history, and that
women have been involved in computing since its origins. It would thus help to
counter the popular misperception that
only men belong in computer science.
If an idea on the LEGO site receives
10,000 supporting votes, they will
consider building the set. To support
a project, you must register on their
site, but registration only takes a minute, so if you want to raise awareness
of computer science in our society,
and help young boys and girls realize computer science is not limited to
males, I encourage you to support this
proposal by clicking the blue button
on the proposal page (https://ideas.
lego.com/projects/102740).
John Arquilla is a professor at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School. Joel C. Adams is a professor at
Calvin College.
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